Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: The Dawn of a New Pleading Standard?
By Antoinette Morgan, Esq.[1] and Brian Telfair, Esq.[2]
The Supreme Court’s decision in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), may very well mark the end of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s rigid notice pleading standard. No longer will a complaint containing indistinct allegations survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim; instead, a complaint must now contain allegations that “nudge [a plaintiff’s] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Id. at 1974.
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court has the authority to dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). However, the liberal pleading standard afforded by Rule 8(a) meant that motions to dismiss were granted sparingly.
The respondents in Twombly were subscribers of local telephone and high speed internet services. They sued regional telephone service monopolies, called Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (“ILECs”) alleging violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations.” 15 U.S.C. § 1. The respondents alleged that the ILECs: (1) engaged in parallel conduct in their respective service areas in an attempt to restrain any competitors, and (2) agreed to refrain from competing with one another, as indicated by their refusal to pursue attractive business areas in contiguous markets. Twombly. at 1955.
The U.S. Supreme Court overruled the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which denied the petitioners’ motion to dismiss, and the High Court upset a pleading standard that was over 50 years old. Conley’s “No Set of Facts” Standard Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), was the foremost decision interpreting Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the proper standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In Conley, the Court articulated the now well-known standard for a complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss: “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless[3] it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Id. at 45-46.
In Conley, African-American railroad workers brought a class action suit against their union seeking to compel the union to represent them fairly in protection of their employment rights under a contract entered into by the union and the railroad. This contract gave the workers protection from discharge and loss of seniority. Id. at 43. The defendants sought dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Id. Specifically, the defendants argued that the complaint did not allege specific facts in support of plaintiffs’ allegation that the defendants discriminated against the workers. Id. at 47. The Court rejected this argument, holding that the Federal Rules require only that the plaintiff give the defendant “fair notice” of plaintiff’s claim and the grounds for the claim. Id. The Court went on to hold that, “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Id. at 44-45. This standard meant that motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) were rarely granted, even in the face of poorly drafted complaints having little merit.
Conley Revisited
In one sense, the Twombly Court criticized Conley’s ”no set of facts” standard. In another it seemingly qualified the standard. For instance, the Court’s analysis of Conley began by citing numerous federal court cases which have criticized Conley’s standard. See, e.g., Twombly at 1969. The Court went on to hold that Conley’s “no set of facts” formulation is “best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard.” Id. at 1969.The Court cautioned that its decision in Conley is often misread. The Court noted that the Conley decision should not have been read literally, because a literal meaning would lead to the conclusion that “a wholly conclusory statement of claim would survive a motion to dismiss whenever the pleadings left open the possibility that a plaintiff might later establish some ‘set of [undisclosed] facts’ to support recovery.” Id. at 1968. Instead, Conley’s “no set of facts” language should be read to mean that “once a claim is adequately stated, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Id. at 1969 (emphasis added). In other words, the Court stated that the “no set of facts” standard “described the breadth of opportunity to prove what an adequate complaint claims, not the minimum standard of adequate pleading to govern a complaint’s survival.” Id.
In Twombly, the High Court retired the long-standing “no set of facts” standard and set forth what some would consider a heightened pleading standard. The Court held that, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Twombly’s decision means that a plaintiff’s complaint will be scrutinized more closely in the face of a motion to dismiss in order to determine whether the complaint contains allegations that “nudge [the plaintiff’s] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Id. at 1974. Applying this new formulation, the Court held that the petitioners’ acts, as alleged by the respondents, could have been individual business decisions by each petitioner, and the complaint did not contain additional allegations demonstrating that the petitioners had formed any type of agreement or conspiracy.
In reaching its decision, the Court recognized the predicament of defendants who were forced to incur the costs of discovery in order to defend a claim where the complaint contains nothing more than naked allegations; and not until after incurring such costs was a defendant given a reasonable opportunity to move for dismissal of the claim by way of summary judgment or by other means. The Court stated, “[w]hen the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, ‘this basic deficiency should . . . be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.’” Id. (citing 5 Wright & Miller § 1216, at 233-34). The Court further noted that defendants may be forced to settle even “anemic” claims to forego the rising costs of discovery. Id. This concern becomes especially relevant in the age of electronic discovery, where expenses may rise exponentially by the close of discovery.
Undoubtedly, the Court ushered in a stricter standard by which courts must judge the sufficiency of a complaint. No longer will it suffice to argue that a groundless claim should be spared in the face of a motion to dismiss because the basis of the claim will be revealed through discovery. Instead, a plaintiff’s complaint must show an entitlement to relief at the outset. Id. at 1967. However, the Court was careful to caution that it is not holding plaintiffs to a “heightened fact pleading of specifics.” Id. at 1974. Instead, the Court was merely holding plaintiffs to the same standard required by Rule 8(a)—that a plaintiff plead “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id.
The dissent disagreed with this characterization. Dissenting Justices Stevens and Ginsburg argued that the majority’s opinion in fact impermissibly held a plaintiff to a higher pleading standard than is required by the Federal Rules’ liberal notice pleading standard. Specifically, the dissent argued that the majority took issue with the respondent’s complaint not because it failed to put the petitioners on notice as to their claims, but because the majority was not satisfied that the petitioners collectively formed an agreement in violation of the Sherman Act. Id. at 1984. The dissent cautioned that such a standard goes to the issue of proof, not to the issue of notice. Id. In turn, the majority criticized the dissent for what it called the dissent’s oversimplification of the Federal Rules. The majority cautioned that while the Federal Rules eliminated the need for plaintiff to set forth the specific facts upon which he bases his claims, “Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a “showing,” rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Id. at 1965 n.3.
Applying Twombly
Immediately after the Twombly decision, the lower courts began scrambling to apply the new standard in ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. One of the most perplexing issues for the courts is the scope of Twombly’s decision. For instance, courts have been forced to consider the argument that Twombly’s pleading standard is limited to antitrust cases. See, e.g., Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 2513 (3d Cir. 2008); Barber v. Allied Oil & Supply, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7227 (W.D. Mo. 2008); IFAST v. Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80080 (D. Md. 2007); Brown v. Sweeney, 526 F. Supp. 2d 126 (D. Mass. 2007).
Although an antitrust claim was the backdrop of the Court’s decision in Twombly, the Court did not expressly limit its holding to antitrust cases. The most obvious evidence of this is its complete abrogation of the “no set of facts” standard. The Court did not announce that Conley’s formulation was no longer a proper standard by which to rule on motions to dismiss in antitrust cases, but instead ruled that ‘no set of facts’ is no longer a proper standard at all. See Twombly at 1969. A number of courts have reached this conclusion, see Phillips, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 2513; Barber, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7227, while others have refused to decide the issue. See, e.g., IFAST at *10 (incorporating Twombly’s language, but cautioning that it was not making any comment as to whether Twombly’s pleading standard applies generally to all civil litigation).
Unless the Supreme Court provides guidance as to the scope of its decision in Twombly, federal courts in each circuit will undoubtedly reach their own decision about Twombly’s impact. As applied to all civil cases, the implications of Twombly are far-reaching. A plaintiff will no longer be permitted to rely on naked allegations with the hope that discovery will reveal relevant facts to that demonstrate that plaintiff is entitled to relief. Instead, a plaintiff must plead enough facts in the complaint to safely nudge his claims across that newly-drawn line from conceivable to plausible. One thing is clear, based on over 1,000 cases that cited Twombly in the six months after the opinion was issued, the impact of Twombly will be the subject of litigation for many years to come.
References
[1] Antoinette Morgan is an associate at LeClairRyan in Richmond, Virginia. She focuses her practice on defending product designers, manufacturers and sellers against alleged product defects. Ms. Morgan may be reached at Antoinette.Morgan@leclairryan.com.[2] Brian Telfair is a shareholder at LeClairRyan in Richmond, Virginia. His practice is principally devoted to defending product designers, manufacturers and sellers against damage claims arising out of alleged product defects, malfunctions or failures. He has defended insurance companies, automobile manufacturers, chemical companies, pharmaceutical companies, fast food companies and gas appliance manufacturers in a variety of matters. Mr. Telfair may be reached at Brian.Telfair@leclairryan.com.
[3] Justice Stevens anticipated this confusion, stating “[w]hether the Court’s actions will benefit only defendants in antitrust treble-damages cases, or whether its test for sufficiency of a complaint will inure to the benefit of all civil defendants, is a question that the future will answer.” Twombly at 1988 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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