Accounting Fraud and Financial Restatement
By Tamika Langley Tremaglio, Kofi Boxill, and Sumit Dangi[1]
There is a fast-growing string of public companies that are admitting that their prior financial statements inflated real business trends. This increase in restatements, which included a fair amount of corporate scandals, prompted the Department of Justice to issue a three-part formal definition describing the illegal activities that encompass corporate fraud: (Part I) Accounting Fraud (sometimes called “Earnings Management”) (Part II) Self-Dealing by Corporate Insiders (Part III) Obstructive Conduct In this article, we examine Part I – Accounting Fraud. We provide an overview of the trend in reporting “corrections” or financial restatements by US public companies; we highlight some of the commonly exploited areas of fraudulent accounting; and finally, we highlight some areas of consideration for legal counsel involved in financial reporting investigations.
Financial Restatements Trend
Table 1 below, which is an excerpt from a study performed by Huron Consulting Group LLC (“the Huron Study”), indicates that the total number of public companies that restated their previously reported financial statements totaled 323 in 2003, a slight decrease from 330 restatement filings in 2002, and up from 270 in 2001 and 233 in 2000. Many of these restatements were due to accounting decisions taken by corporate executives that could be categorized as errors and incorrect application of accounting rules, adoption of aggressive judgment positions within the rules, and/or outright accounting fraud (Table 1: Year 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 Number of Restatements respectively 216, 233, 270, 330, 323).
Restatement Reasons
Per the Huron Study, the reasons for the restatements can generally be classified into three categories: (i) problems/non-clarity related to application of accounting rules, i.e., Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), (ii) human and system errors, and (iii) fraudulent behavior by executives of the organization. The complexities of accounting systems and GAAP rules have grown significantly over the last 10 years. The vast number of rules and complexities has provided opportunities for some executives to exploit the complexities and gray areas in accounting to manipulate desired financial results without violating the requisite disclosure (GAAP) requirements, or without being illegal or inaccurate.However, some of these restatements were due to fraudulent financial reporting, otherwise referred to as “earnings management” or accounting fraud. Per the Department of Justice, accounting fraud is defined as “the falsification of financial information, including false accounting entries, bogus trades designed to inflate profits or hide losses, and false transactions designed to evade regulatory oversight.” The DOJ listed the following as the primary motives often cited for executives willing to go as far as they have in committing accounting fraud to achieve desired financial results:
- Aggressive Targets – usually tied to executive compensation;
- Earnings Growth Pressures – must “make the numbers”, i.e., analyst expectations;
- Loan Covenants Requirements – including threat of bankruptcy;
- Poor Corporate Governance Practices – fiduciary duties neglected;
- Inadequate System of Controls – including poor “checks and balances”;
- Greed – unethical corporate behavior and culture.
A typical accounting fraud scenario starts with small manipulations of accounting entries (“one-time acts”) due to the pressures referenced above. These entries eventually have a snowballing effect that perpetuates itself with each successive reporting period. Before long, these one-time acts escalate into a deliberate pattern of continuous fraudulent reporting.
A Closer Look At Accounting Fraud Schemes
Per the Huron Study, the leading causes of restatements in 2003, listed in order of frequency, involved accounting for the following: (i) Reserves & Contingencies, (ii) Revenue Recognition, (iii) Equity, (iv) Capitalization vs Expensing of Assets, and (v) Inventory. Accounting for reserves and contingencies requires management judgment regarding estimated future expenditures. An expense that is estimable and probable is recorded on the income statement, and a liability or reserve is recorded on the balance sheet to account for a loss or cost contingency which was triggered by a known event in the current fiscal period. Misuse of this accounting principle is sometimes called “cookie jar” or “rainy day” reserves.- Cookie Jar/Rainy Day Reserves - Management may overestimate these reserves in the current period when business results appear strong (higher expense recorded), and dip into the cookie jar in the future to reduce the inflated reserve and related expenses when business results appear weak. Earnings are thus “managed” to allow growth to appear “smoother” and more predictable over time. The opposite occurs as well where reserves are underestimated in current periods of bad results and increased in future periods of good results. The DOJ also listed some common fraudulent revenue recognition schemes deployed by management are as follows.
- Revenue Acceleration - This scheme includes inappropriately booking future period revenues into current period. Some of the common examples include recording revenues for goods that have not been shipped or accelerated reporting of percentage of completion contracts.
- Phantom Sales - This includes recording sales for goods that were never sold (fake invoices created) or services never performed. An example of this scheme is “parked inventory sales” where sales are recorded for goods shipped to a site (warehouse, parking lot), which in reality is controlled by the seller. This provides the appearance that a valid sale occurred.
- Swap Transactions - Some companies inflate revenues by conspiring with other companies and exchanging services and payments solely for the purpose of recording these swap “transactions” or agreements as valid sales.
- Channel Stuffing - Some companies oversell their products to distributors and retailers in this scheme. In the future, this excess product is either returned to the seller or a deep discount is given to the customer.
The primary schemes associated with the fraudulent recording or nonrecording of expenses incurred by companies are as follows.
- Capitalization of Expenses - If a cash outflow is treated as an “expense” on the books, it reduces net earnings, while recording the outflow as an “asset” does not reduce earnings. Some companies mistreat these outflows while initially recording them in the books, while others reclassify expenses as assets at the end of the year.
- Deferred or Undisclosed Expenses - In this scheme, the company “does not record the expense at all” and keeps it “off the books”, whereas in the capitalization scheme discussed previously, the company records the expenses incorrectly to inflate net earnings.
Enforcement Report Card
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act mandates periodic reporting of enforcement efforts and results by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). Pursuant to Section 704 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC issued an enforcement activity report based on levels of individuals pursued, for the five years ended July 31, 2002, as illustrated below.Table 2 - Tally of Enforcements by Level of Individual
Position of Individual Number of Individuals Number of Individuals and Individuals Charged Charged with Fraud (respectively): Chairmen 75, 63; CEOs 111, 99; Presidents 111, 96; Chief Financial Officers 105, 79; Chief Operating Officers 21, 19; Chief Accounting Officers 16, 14; VP’s of Finance 27, 19; General Counsel 11, 8; Controllers 47, 28.In July 2003, the SEC Corporate Fraud Task Force (“the Task Force”), chaired by Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson and professionals from the Commission as well as other governmental investigative and prosecutorial offices, issued its first anniversary report noting accomplishments achieved during its first twelve months. The Task Force’s criminal and civil/ regulatory prosecution results were tabulated as follows:
Table 3 – Criminal Prosecution Statistics (July 2002-May 2003)
Corporate Fraud Convictions 250, Current Investigations 320, Individual Subjects Under Review 500, Currently Filed Cases 169, Subjects Involved in Pending Cases 354.Table 4 – Civil Regulatory Enforcement (As of June 2003)
SEC Civil Enforcements Filed 443, Companies Suspended from Trading 11, Companies’ Assets Frozen 30, Actions Sought to Bar Executives from Practice with Public Companies 124.What do you do when your company is being investigated?
The common sources that provide initial notice of wrongdoing that trigger financial investigations are: ethics hotlines, “Whistleblowers”, internal and external auditors, legal counsel (Rule 307), regulators, employees, and the media. Per a Huron Consulting Group presentation “Real World Tensions Surrounding Financial Reporting Problems: What’s a General Counsel To Do?”, the following are key questions that in-house counsel should consider when involved in a financial investigationUpon Initial Notice of Concern
Has the company established a Qualified Legal Compliance Committee (“QLCC”) or designated another committee to serve its functions? Does the company have a process on how concerns should be handled? How do companies know what or who to believe? When should companies invoke privilege? What is the standard for retaining records? Who should be involved? Is the concern legitimate? What is the root cause of the issue? When should companies disclose issues to their auditors? When should companies disclose issues to the audit committee and Board of Directors? When does the company know enough to request a “special investigation?"When Conducting The Investigation
Who should be responsible for the investigation: Board of Directors, QLCC, Audit Committee, Corporation as a legal entity represented by counsel, Reliance on management, More than one investigation. Should companies use outside counsel? Was outside counsel involved in structuring transactions in question? Will the SEC view them as independent? Should accounting and finance personnel be involved in the investigation? How should disagreements over historical accounting judgments between management, auditor, audit committee, and/or forensic accountants be handled? Should forensic accounting experts be engaged to assist in the investigation or provide consultation? Should internal audit be used to help with the investigation? When should the company disclose issues to regulators?The Aftermath
Who, if anyone, should be held accountable for identified wrongdoings: Board of Directors, Management, Third Parties. How should the Board assess and determine whether changes are appropriate? How and with whom do you rebuild trust in the organization: Employees, Customers, Vendors, Investors, Regulators. How do you resolve the lingering pieces (SEC Actions, Class Action Litigation)? Are there immediate considerations to avoid repeat occurrences? Training and upgrade of personnel, Corporate Governance Improvement, Internal Control Improvement, Improved Notification Mechanisms, Public company financial restatements and accounting fraud threaten investor confidence in the capital markets, and regulatory and enforcement agency investigations are on the rise. Corporate governance expectations have also increased and include “up the ladder” reporting by in-house counsel. Huron Consulting Group professionals have the forensic accounting, financial and economic analysis, and litigation consulting expertise to assist you with many of the issues identified in this article.References
[1] Tamika Langley Tremaglio, JD/MBA, is a Managing Director and Kofi Boxill, CPA and Sumit Dangi, CPA/CFA, are associates at Huron Consulting Group’s Washington, D.C. office. If you have questions, please contact Ms. Tremaglio at 202 756-4554 or ttremalglio@ huronconsultinggroup.com.






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